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ABSTRACT 
The widespread proliferation of sensor nodes in the era of Internet 
of Things (IoT) coupled with increasing sensor fidelity and data-
acquisition modality is expected to generate 3+ Exabytes of data 
per day by 2018. Since most of these IoT devices will be wirelessly 
connected at the last few feet, wireless communication is an integral 
part of the future IoT scenario. The ever-shrinking size of unit 
computation (Moore’s Law) and continued improvements in 
efficient communication (Shannon’s Law) is expected to harness 
the true potential of the IoT revolution and produce dramatic 
societal impact. However, reducing size of IoT nodes and lack of 
significant improvement in energy-storage density leads to 
reducing energy-availability. Moreover, smaller size and energy 
means less resources available for securing IoT nodes, making the 
energy-sparse low-cost leaf nodes of the network as prime targets 
for attackers. In this paper, we survey six prominent wireless 
technologies with respect to the three dimensions—security, energy 
efficiency, and communication capacity. We point out the state-of-
the-art, open issues, and the road ahead for promising research 
directions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cheap Ubiquitous Computing  Smart Things: Through five 
decades of continued scaling, following Moore’s Law, the size of 
unit computing has gone to virtually zero.  Starting with mainframe 
computers in the 60’s, that used to be of the size of a room, we saw 
continuous reduction in the size of a computer. We saw computers 
progress through the Mini, the Workstation, the Personal Computer 
(PC) down to Laptops in the 2000’s (Figure 1). The decade of 2010 
was dominated by Mobile devices (e.g. Smartphones). By the year 
2020, the size of unit (meaningful) computation will be so small 
that it will be barely visible. This will enable cheap, ubiquitous 
computation all around us, incorporated into everyday things like 
wearables, household devices, and mobile payment devices. The 
ability to incorporate significant computation in an almost invisible 
footprint is transforming everyday objects into Smart Things. 
Cheap Wireless Connectivity  Connected Things: The 
emergence of the Internet as a household commodity worldwide 
coupled with tremendous progress in commoditization of wireless 
connectivity (especially cellular 5G and wireless LAN) means that 
billions of things can now be wirelessly connected to the Internet.  
Smart Connected Things  Internet of Things (IoT): The 
emergence of cheap computing following Moore’s Law is enabling 
Smart Things and emergence of cheap wireless connectivity 
following Shannon’s law (Figure 1) is creating smart connected 
things. At present, we are standing at the crossroads of smart and 
connected internet of things (IoT), which is quickly transforming 
human lives. The number of internet connected devices has already 
passed the number of human beings on the planet in 2009 and is 
increasing exponentially. Cisco estimates that by 2020, there will 
be  3.4 devices and connections per person.   
Smaller Size, Similar Energy-Density  Lower Available 
Energy: Though the size of unit computation is falling fast, the 
energy-storage/battery technology is improving only very slowly, 
leading to a reducing amount of available energy in smaller nodes. 
Due to its small footprint, the size of the battery included in such 
sensor nodes is limited. Moreover, including a battery means 
increased deployment cost and more importantly maintenance cost 
(to change the battery periodically). Since the electronics lifetime 
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Figure 1:  IoT as the junction of Moore’s Law and Shannon’s Law. A big bottleneck for Ubiquitous Computing using IoT Nodes is reduced energy availability 
and increased security vulnerabilities in leaf nodes as the size of the node decreases
is generally significantly higher than battery-lifetime, it is desirable 
to develop Net-Zero Energy sensor nodes, that perpetually run on 
harvested energy. Whereas the trend is to pack more and more 
functionality even in energy-constrained nodes and they need to 
communicate wirelessly. This leads to energy-gap and calls for 
significant improvement in energy-efficiency for computing and 
communication in energy-constrained nodes. 
Smaller Size, Lower-Energy  Lower Resource Availability 
for Security: It is well-known that the security of a network is often 
only as good as its weakest link. Energy-sparse, size-constrained 
IoT nodes have limited resources to guarantee strong security and 
hence often are the weakest link in the end-to-end system. While 
the resource available for security is reducing (Figure 1, right) with 
reducing size, the security requirements of these leaf nodes are 
increasing, creating a strong need for research in lightweight, 
resource-constrained security technologies.  
In many of the compelling application areas, the security of the 
communication channel is of primary importance, including the 
possibility of eavesdropping (i.e., loss of confidentiality) and denial 
of service (i.e., loss of availability) [1]. The two concerns that have 
traditionally been looked at for this class of systems are energy-
efficiency, and communication capacity [2]. In this paper, we 
analyze prominent wireless technologies for IoT with respect to the 
three dimensions—security, energy efficiency, and communication 
capacity. These dimensions are of course inter-related, e.g., an 
otherwise energy-efficient system may become unusable if it needs 
cryptographic protocols and that is expensive on such systems.  
2. PROMINENT TECHNOLOGIES 
Multiple classes of wireless technologies, namely, Wireless Local 
Area Network (WLAN: Wi-Fi, Bluetooth), Sensor Network 
(ZigBee), Near-field (NFC and emerging High-speed Proximity 
Communication [3]), and wide-area wireless communication 
(LoRa), will be compared across security, energy efficiency, and 
communication capacity.  
	
2.1 Energy-Efficiency and Communication-
Capacity 
State-of-the-art: Table 1 summarizes several wireless techniques 
in terms of communication distance supported, typical energy-
efficiency (in Joules/bit), data rate (communication capacity in Bits 
per second) and security. Figure 2 plots these technologies on the 
energy-efficiency (Y-axis) vs. Data rate (X-axis). It is to be noted, 
that the maximum data rate are often limited by FCC and the 
standard. The communication energy-efficiency varies from 
several from pJ/b to J/b, i.e., six-orders of magnitude, depending 
on the PHY and the distance supported. Significant amount of this 
energy is wasted due to inflexible, worst-case radio designs [4].   
Energy-Gap: Current battery technology supports enough energy 
for low-performance communication, and hence we are seeing a 
plethora of commercial low-performance battery-operated IoT 
devices. However, mobile devices are severely energy-constrained 
for both battery-operated high-performance devices and energy-
harvested low-performance devices. A typical smartphone battery 
holds 5-10 Watt-hour of energy. Communicating 10 Gbps data 
(e.g., 4K video, 30fps, RGB, 12b color depth = 9.56 Gbps raw) at 
1nJ/b means 10 Watt power. Hence the mobile battery runs out 
within an hour, just supporting such communication, let alone 
processing and display. Similarly, for energy-harvested devices, 
solar harvesting lends tens of mWs of power in favorable outdoor 
conditions. However, for all other modalities (e.g., indoor lighting, 
vibration, thermal, and RF harvesting) typical harvested power falls 
in the range of 50-200µW. For a sensor node trying to communicate 
1Mbps (e.g., compressed, intermittent video) with energy 
efficiency of 1nJ/b, it will consume 1mW just for the 
communication portion. This highlights the energy-gap present for 
current IoT sensor nodes. An order of magnitude improvement in 
communication energy-efficiency will open up many applications 
of ubiquitous connected IoT nodes. 	
2.2 Security considerations 
As we gradually move toward using some of the smart devices for 
critical operations, security will become a primary driver for which 
devices win out in the marketplace. We are already seeing some 
such uses around us, such as, in mobile payment systems (Google 
Wallet, Apple Pay, Samsung Pay) and wearable healthcare devices 
which monitor for critical health signals (such as, heart rate, VO2 
level) and in case of critical indicators, communicate to a health 
provider. We survey here some of the successes and challenges for 
securing the wireless technologies under discussion here. We also 
discuss some of the unique aspects of security in this domain. In all 
of this, it is important to keep in mind that security should be 
considered as improving the state of affairs in one of the three axes 
(Figure 2) – confidentiality (of the information being stored or 
exchanged), integrity (of the data being stored), and availability 
(being able to access the device and its stored state). Also, the 
security achieved is hardly ever zero-or-one for any of these axes, 
but rather on a sliding scale.  
Geographical Proximity as an Aid 
Technologies that operate in very close proximity, such as NFC 
with < 20 cm range, rule out most man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attacks. A typical MITM attack scenario is as follows, where 
Table 1: Comparison of State-of-the-art Wireless Techniques for IoT nodes 
 Proximity NFC ZigBee BT WiFi LoRa 
Distance (m) 1mm 10cm 10-100m 10-100m 30-50m ~km 
Data rate 
(bps) 8-32 G 0.02-0.4 M 0.02-0.2 M 0.8-2.1 M 
300M (11g) 
7Gbps (11ac,11d) 200K 
Energy-
Efficiency 
(J/b) 
4p 1n 5n 15n 5n 1u 
Security1 H1 M L1 L M/H1 Relatively Unknown 
 
Mallory, an attacker, is interposing herself between the 
communication of two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob. This kind 
of MITM attack, uniquely to our proximal wireless communication 
scenarios, is possible even when cryptography is being used, due to 
the ability of the attacker to intercept the communication.  
1. Alice sends her public key to Bob, but Mallory can intercept it. 
Mallory sends Bob her own public key for which she has the 
matching private key. Now Bob wrongly thinks that he has Alice’s 
public key. 
2. Bob sends his public key to Alice, but Mallory can intercept it. 
Mallory sends Alice her own public key for which she has the 
matching private key. Now Alice wrongly thinks that she has Bob’s 
public key. 
3. Alice sends Bob a message encrypted with Mallory’s public key, 
but Mallory can intercept it. Mallory decrypts the message with her 
private key, keeps a copy of the message, re-encrypts the message 
with Bob’s public key, and sends the message to Bob. Now Bob 
wrongly thinks that the message came directly from Alice and has 
no indication that the message has been intercepted and decrypted. 
4. Similarly to step 3 above, when Bob sends Alice a message, 
Mallory can again decrypt it and optionally modify it, before 
passing it on to Alice pretending that it came from Bob.  
This kind of MITM attack can be mitigated if Alice and Bob have 
visual connection due to geographical proximity and can prove to 
each other’s devices that there is such proximity. This typically 
requires entering a secondary authentication token that appears on 
both devices, such as, a long random pin. It is in the choice of the 
secondary authentication mechanism that the capability of the 
device will become a crucial factor. For example, if the device has 
output display, then the pin can be displayed; if the device has a 
touch sensor, then Alice and Bob can be asked to authenticate by 
physically touching the other’s device.  
Isolation and abstraction 
Isolation of different hardware and software modules has been 
considered a key building block for secure systems in the traditional 
desktop and server world. This means that there are boundaries to 
what each hardware or software module can access (e.g., only some 
parts of the device’s memory) and thus if one module is 
compromised, the entire system does not get compromised. In the 
domain under consideration here, such isolation may or may not be 
possible depending on the specific device’s price point. One 
example where such isolation is widely used today is in smart 
phones. In most smart phones, there is the relatively powerful main 
processor and a separate baseband processor [5]. The baseband 
processor runs the radio control functions, which have real-time 
requirements, and therefore a real-time OS runs on the baseband 
processor. However, due to the proprietary nature of the software 
stack on it, there are often security vulnerabilities found in these 
[6]. The software on the main processor trusts the software running 
on the baseband processor and thus the vulnerability can spread. 
Thus, we see that despite isolation, if the separation is not enforced, 
security breaches occur. Therefore, the correct design point is 
whenever isolation is possible, either in hardware or software, then 
enforcement of the separation boundary is needed. Some recent 
efforts with low-end embedded devices [7], [8] are showing how it 
is possible to enforce isolation with limited hardware support and 
mainly through software techniques. We acknowledge however 
that for many low-end smart things, such isolation will be infeasible 
and therefore systems must be built with an acknowledgment of the 
vulnerable nodes and understanding of their spread potential.  
Out-of-band mechanism for security 
An interesting interplay between multiple technologies happens in 
this space to provide increased security. Many security protocols 
rely on some out-of-band (OOB) mechanism for exchanging some 
critical information, which helps secure a communication channel. 
In authentication, OOB refers to utilizing two separate networks or 
channels, one of which is different from the primary network or 
channel, simultaneously used to communicate between two parties 
or devices for identifying a user. For example, a cellular network is 
commonly used for out-of-band authentication. An example of out-
of-band authentication is when an online banking user is accessing 
her online bank account with a login and a one-time password 
(OTP) is sent to her mobile phone via SMS. The primary channel 
 
Figure 2: State-of-the-art energy-efficiency vs. Communication data rate prominent wireless IoT PHYs. The size of the circle represents the strengths of 
security, which consists of Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity. The gap in the bottom left motivates research need for low-speed, reliable yet highly 
efficient secure communication techniques  
would be the online login screen where the user enters her login 
information and the OTP sent through the out-of-band channel. 
In our domain, oftentimes there is a clear OOB which is the humans 
interacting through their respective devices [9]. This naturally 
allows certain levels of trust to be established among the 
communicating individuals. With the right security protocol, this 
trust can be transferred to devices that belong to the users, enabling 
two devices to establish a trusted communication channel that 
reflects the existing trust their users place on one another. A typical 
example is the pairing of two Bluetooth devices with active 
participation of the users. In the Bluetooth, Secure Simple Pairing 
(SSP) mode, it uses NFC for achieving security. One issue to keep 
in mind here is that the devices should be reasonably time 
synchronized, say to within 10s of milliseconds. Much more 
accurate time synchronization has been demonstrated even for ad-
hoc wireless networks [1]. 
 
3. THE ROAD AHEAD	
	
3.1 Communication Capacity and Energy-
Efficiency 
In this data-driven IoT revolution, workloads, operating conditions 
and computational/communication demands on distributed and 
connected devices will undergo large dynamic ranges of several 
orders of magnitude. Energy constrained IoT nodes will demand 
the highest possible energy efficiency across the entire range of 
operation under changing contexts. A context could be defined as 
channel conditions, applications, latency, QoS, data rate 
requirements, battery condition, process variation, among others. 
Current systems are typically over-designed to handle all possible 
context, which creates an unfavorable trade-off between fidelity 
and power efficiency. Learning from nature, we notice that a human 
brain, continuously adapts to its surroundings to perform more 
efficiently. It also self-learns [10] the optimum ways with 
experience. Similarly, in context-aware communication, a smart 
IoT device understands its own context and adapts itself “on-the 
fly” for optimal energy-efficiency and performance. Such context-
aware communication could be divided in two distinct categories, 
namely Intra-PHY [11] and Inter-PHY adaptation, as described in 
[2]. In brief, the former means adapting within one physical layer 
wireless communication channel, while the latter involves multiple 
such channels.  
Along with context-awareness, innovative technologies specific to 
emerging applications can enable order(s) of magnitude 
improvement in both communication capacity and energy-
efficiency, even simultaneously. As an example, recently 
developed Capacitive Proximity communication [3] provides wire-
like data rate (32Gbps) and energy-efficiency (4pJ/b) without a 
physical wire, and enables >100× benefit over short-range mm-
wave communication, allowing high-speed transfer (e.g., fast 
video, photo download from smartphone to laptop just by placing 
it on top of the laptop, without connecting a wire). Another example 
is Human Body Communication [12], that utilizes the conductive 
properties of human body to connect wearables and implantables, 
reducing Body Area Network (BAN) connectivity energy by 
>100x, while improving privacy, as the signals are mostly 
contained within the body and cannot be snooped from far away by 
an adversary. Similar application-specific technology 
developments will be needed to unlock energy efficiency of >10x 
and more.  
Most importantly, since communication energy is often the 
bottleneck, it’s wise to communicate ‘information’ than ‘raw data’ 
to and from the sensor nodes. This only makes sense if the energy 
cost of in-sensor information-extraction (i.e., in-sensor analytics) is 
significantly lower than the communication energy cost and a 
context-dependent optimum exists between in-sensor analytics and 
communication. It has been shown recently [13], that by tracking 
this optimum energy-point a IoT Wireless Video Sensor Node can 
achieve 4.3x improvement in energy efficiency.   
3.2 Security 
We would like to see active development of usable security 
solutions for this space. These security solutions will span the range 
in the following dimensions: (i) resource consumption (compute, 
network communication); (ii) level of security (e.g., does it provide 
protection against replay attacks? How much of a brute force attack 
can it tolerate?); (iii) level of user intervention required (does the 
user need to type in a 6-digit pin, or is only a directional pointing 
of the device enough?); (iv) use of a trusted third party (does the 
protocol require intermediation of a trusted third party? This is an 
active consideration in mobile payment systems where different 
product offerings keep a lot, little, or no trusted information with 
the vendors like Google, Apple, or Samsung).  
An important unmet need for security solutions is context 
awareness. One would want not to have to spend precious energy 
resources on a security protocol (which can often involve expensive 
network communication) if the environment is benign. For 
example, if there are several interfering sources of wireless 
communication, with potentially malicious intent, then a higher 
level of security posture may be warranted than in a benign 
environment. One important question is to what extent should the 
system automatically infer the context and to what extent, this 
should be input by the user. We should take care that the cure 
should not become more damaging than the malaise, i.e., inferring 
context should not become more resource consuming than in the 
baseline mode.  
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